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JUDGMENTALISM
Caroline J. Simon

Under what circumstances, and with what attitudes, should we make moral evaluations of
others? I attempt to answer this question by examining a common vice connected with
moral evaluation, judgmentalism (the disposition to derive satisfaction from making negative moral assessment of others because one believes one's own moral worth is enhanced
by the failure of others). A Christian view of judgmentalism is discussed, as well as the
vice which is the opposite of judgmcntalism, moral cowardice (the disposition to be so
adverse to making negative assessments of others that one avoids doing so even when
such assessments are appropriate and warranted).

Nineteen eighty-seven may well go down in media history as the year of the "holy
wars" among television evangelists. Christian leader A admits a serious moral
failure; Christian leader B publicly condemns A's actions and claims A's behavior
disqualifies A for continued ministry in the Christian community. Both A and B
are held up for public ridicule by the media: A for his failure, B for his judgmental,
"unChristian" attitude toward A. As members of the Christian community our
responses may range from sadness, through embarrassment, to confusion. Is B
violating the biblical injunction to "judge not, that you be not judged" (Matt. 7: 1)
or is he instead correctly applying the equally biblical injunction to "judge with
right judgment" (In. 7:24)? In asking such a question, in even inquiring into the
issue of whether B is being judgmental, are we in danger ourselves of being judgmental toward B? Should we, then, in order to be truly Christian in our attitudes,
totally refrain from making judgments about the conduct and character of others?
If not, what should we do?
Such situations give us practical reasons for desiring clarification of the concept
of "judgmentalism.'" Such a clarification is also of significant philosophical
interest, for judgmentalism is a second-order normative concept concerning the
propriety of evaluative judgments. Distinguishing it from other second-order
vices, and from second-order virtues, can help us sort out when and how to make
appropriate use of our capacity for moral evaluation. "Judgmental," which is a
new enough locution not to have found its way into many dictionaries, is a fairly
recent replacement for a cluster of related terms. It is akin to censoriousness
(the tendency to enjoy publicly finding fault with others), officiousness (the
tendency to volunteer one's services where they are neither asked nor needed),
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and impertinence (the tendency to be unduly concerned in affairs other than one's
own). Judgmentalism contains elements of each of these, along with others. It is a
collection of intellectual mistakes and affective defects all related to the activity
of making moral judgments. On the surface judgmentaJism presents itself as a
syndrome with a confusing array of symptoms. In what follows I will propose an
analysis which attempts to identify what is central to judgmentalism. My hope is
that this analysis will (1) make sense of the symptoms which we associate with
judgmentalism by showing how they are causally related to what is central to judgmentalism and (2) distinguish a mere display of one or more of judgmentalism's
symptoms from actually being judgmental.
I.

Let me begin with a rather broad-brushed portrait of what I take to be a paradigmatic judgmental individual. For convenience, I will call this individual J. J makes
many negative moral evaluations of the conduct and character of others. Sometimes he avoids expressing these judgments: for J knows that unless one is careful
to express one's negative judgments only in certain circles, and then only about
members of certain other circles, expressing negative moral judgments can make
one unpopular. J makes many of his negative judgments on inadequate information; he jumps to negative moral conclusions. More specifically, he often
makes global negative assessments of the character of others based on a small
amount of evidence. He moves quite easily from judgments of the form "This
action is morally wrong" to ones of the form "This agent is morally bad." J also
has a moral rating system which is skewed in his own favor. For example, J, who
happens to be temperate but unsympathetic, thinks of those who display gluttony
or licentiousness as totally depraved, while thinking of his own insensitivity as
a foible (ifhe recognizes it as a fault at all). J also makes moral judgments on inappropriate occasions about inappropriate objects. He has the tendency to meddle
(at least in thought) in the business of others and spend time forming moral judgments about affairs in which he is not involved and has no legitimate role to play.
In addition, J has a very short list of morally neutral areas of human choice and
recognizes few, if any, morally acceptable alternatives to his own way of life.
J is smug and self-satisfied, at least on the surface; he is always happy to see
those of whom he makes negative assessments "get what they deserve."2
This description of J contains a fairly long and complicated list of ingredients.
Conceivably, we could take judgmentalism to be a Wittgensteinian "family
resemblance" concept,' stopping with this description and the remarks: J is
judgmental; anyone who has enough of the characteristics which J displays is
also judgmental. This would be unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. I think
that judgmentalism is usefully seen as a vice, i.e., as both a disposition and a
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moral defect. But many of 1's characteristics, taken in isolation, would be very
implausible as dispositions. For example, how could someone have a specific
disposition to jump to negative moral conclusions? Intellectual sloth might lead
to hasty assessments of all sorts; but why just hasty moral conclusions? A failure
to take the enterprise of moral evaluation seriously might lead to sloppy moral
thinking; but why just hasty negative conclusions? Others of 1's characteristics
(while arguably mistakes) would not be moral defects. 1's belief that his own
way of life is one among few morally acceptable alternatives may be mistaken,
but taken in isolation it could quite plausibly be a case of non-culpable ignorance.
Consequently, if we settle for a family-resemblance account of judgmentalism,
we will leave important questions unanswerable: Why should a person be taken
to have a vice simply because he has enough of a set of characteristics which
in themselves are not vices? Why do these characteristics constitute judgmentalism and not others? How is judgmental ism related to other defective dispositions (for example, officiousness) which are also connected with some of the
characteristics which J has?
In light of this, I will propose a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
judgmentalism. Undoubtedly, some will complain that the definition I propose
does not fit their use of this term. In defense I have two things to say. First, the
definition I will propose represents a genuine vice which occurs frequently enough
to deserve some tenn, although it is, of course, of little importance which tenn
that is so long as we all know what we are talking about. Second, the definition
shows how 1's characteristics (which are, I think, the sort of thing people mean
when they talk about someone being judgmental) hang together in a way which
makes sense of seeing them as symptoms of a single vice. If there are other
definitions which do this as well as the one I am proposing, I do not know what
they would be; however, I would be happy if my proposal motivated others'
exploration of this issue.
Judgmentalism (I claim) is the disposition to derive satisfaction from making
negative moral assessments of others because one believes one's own moral
worth is enhanced by the failures of others. The motive which is central to
judgmentalism is a kind of moral one-up-manship. The judgmental person finds
satisfaction in seeing others fail because he thinks it shows him to be better than
they are. In the case of a person who feels morally inferior, this satisfaction
usually takes the fonn of relief that he is not so bad after all. In the case of a
person who has an inflated view of his own moral worth, or lacks an appreciation
of his own potential for moral failure, the satisfaction comes from having his
sense of moral superiority reinforced.
Applying this definition to 1's case makes sense of his varied characteristics.
Why does he make so many negative judgments? Because he gains satisfaction
from doing so, which either stems from an amelioration of his negative self-assess-
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ment or a reinforcement of his positive one. Why does he jump to negative
conclusions, especially conclusions about character? Because he wants to believe
the moral worst of others; seeing someone as making an isolated moral slip is
not as enjoyable to J as believing the person to be corrupt. Why is 1's moral
rating system skewed? Because he wants not only to think badly of others, but
to see them as worse than he is. Why does he spend time making moral assessments when there is no practical point in doing so? This again stems from his
enjoyment of arriving at negative assessments, which may motivate him to seek
material for these assessments outside his own legitimate sphere of influence
when none is available within it. Why does J have such a short list of morally
neutral areas of choice? Because the longer the list of moral requirements, the
more opportunity for others to fail to meet these requirements-and the more
opportunities to gloat.
It should be clear that there are many, many things wrong with jUdgmentalism.
This disposition often produces the disposition to make false moral assessments.
This is because the judgmental person makes hasty leaps to unwarranted negative
conclusions. Connected with it is a cluster of (perhaps tacit) false beliefs about
ethics, human nature, and the point of making moral jUdgments. 4 Judgmental
people act as though they think it is almost always easy to know what is best.
They seem to believe that they can know that what so-and-so did was wrong,
even though they often know very much less about the context of so-and-so' s
action than so-and-so. Judgmental people act as though they believe that the
range of ethically acceptable forms of life is quite narrow (sometimes confined
to the set of lives exactly similar to their own). Although such matters as whether
and when to have children, whether and whom to marry, the balance of power
and division of labor within families, and the allocation of time and income are
not morally neutral, the factors involved are complex enough that only an ideal
observer should presume to second guess another's decisions in these areas within
a very wide range of choices. The judgmental person often ignores this fact.
Judgmental people also act as though they believe that the relation between
action and character is straightforward and simple, when in fact one must almost
always know a person quite well to be able to say when an action is or is not
"in character." The judgmental person's frequent assumption that s/he knows
what sort of awful person so-and-so must be to have done such-and-such ignores
this.
The judgmental person also (at least tacitly) misconstrues the whole point of
moral assessment. Moral worth does not work on a kind of competitive point
system, and the point of moral assessment is not the relative ranking of individuals. The ultimate point of thinking about ethics is practical. 5 This suggests that
the primary point of my making moral assessments is so that I can act well and
do what I can toward being a better sort of person. First-person assessments are
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primary; third-person assessments are appropriate only to the extent they contribute to each person acting well. 6
This account should have made it plain why judgmentalism is both an intellectual and a moral vice. It is an intellectual vice because it both feeds on and
engenders a systematic distortion of reality. It is based on and encourages false
beliefs about the nature of the ethical life, and the moral condition of oneself
and others. It is a moral vice because it adversely affects our relationship with
others. It feeds on and engenders a lack of sympathetic understanding of others,
squelching the virtue of compassion. It aids and abets a related constellation of
vices: hypocrisy, malice, and insensitivity. It also interferes with what Lawrence
Blum calls engagement of our emotions and being-toward-others. 7 The human
capacity for self-transformation should probably not be overestimated, but clearly
we can sometimes work toward ridding ourselves of vices and cultivating virtues
which we lack. Obviously, we cannot do this unless we can see when we have
a vice or lack a virtue. Judgmentalism interferes with this self-knowledge. It
makes us, as the classic passage on judgmental ism says, so hypersensitive to
the speck in another's eye that we are blind to the log in our own. 8
II.
This New Testament passage brings up an issue worth addressing. It is fairly
easy to see why judgmentalism is a vice if it is bound up with the set of false
beliefs which we have discussed. If it arises from a sense of moral inferiority it
amounts to a kind of displacement behavior which interferes with the natural
response to negative moral self-assessment: effort to improve. But, it might be
claimed, surely some people are better than others. If this is so, a person could
have a justified true belief in his own moral superiority. What would be wrong
with such a person having such a belief accompanied by enjoyment of reinforcing
his sense of superiority by arriving at true negative assessments of others? This
enjoyment might be analogous to that of a champion tennis player who enjoys
not only the exercise of his capacities and the contemplation of his own excellence,
but also the fact that he is much better than others at this game. If such an
attitude is understandable and blameless in skilled activities, what is wrong with
a similar attitude displayed in the moral realm? One sort of answer to this question
(and perhaps this would have been Aristotle's) is: nothing. In cases where the
enjoyment of making negative assessments of others is not tied up with the
collection of intellectual mistakes discussed in Section I, it might be claimed
that this is a relatively innocent pleasure. This would mean that judgmentalism
motivated by a sense of superiority is only accidentally vicious.
In contrast to the above view, a major portion of the Christian theological tradition maintains that a sense of moral superiority will always evidence a misappre-
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hension of reality. 9 This is one reason for the disagreement between Aristotle and
the New Testament over whether pride is a virtue or a vice. Jesus' assumption in the
Sermon on the Mount (and Paul's assumption in a similar passage in the second
chapter of Romans) is that of course anyone who is judging another has the same
problem (or one just as serious) as the person whom he judges. This assumption
appears to rest on two others: everyone has some moral failings, and there is no
rank-ordering of moral failings. 1O The doctrine of the general fallenness of humanity suggests that our attitude toward someone who has made a moral mistake
should be gentleness and that an appropriate response to such a situation is always
self-examination. II Just as the doctrine ofthe fall makes feelings of moral superiority inappropriate, the doctrine of grace makes moral insecurity inappropriate,
thus cutting judgmentalism off at its motivational roots. In addition, a theology
which maintains that human brokenness breaks the heart of God supplements the
moral reasons for taking enjoyment of another's failures to be totally inappropriate
with a theological reason for this inappropriateness. 12
Another theological reason given by New Testament authors for exercising
care in our evaluations of others, is that judgmental people usurp a role which
legitimately belongs to God.13 A non-theist who is also serious about morality
may feel that he has a responsibility to do whatever he can to see that morality
is taken seriously by everyone. This in turn may give him a reason for making
thorough evaluations of the conduct and character of others whenever he has an
opportunity, so that he will be prepared to enforce morality where possible and
shape the character of others for the better when he can. Such a stance will not
in itself lead to judgmentalism, since the motive here is not malicious. I find it
difficult, however, to see how such a person could escape being officious. He
might respond by claiming that he is not offering his services where they are
not needed, since his services, as one who perceives what morality requires more
clearly than others do, are needed. I think this response might be correct, ifhe
were correct in thinking both that there is no God and that morality ought to be
taken seriously. However, if God does exist and does bear the relationship to
people which Christianity claims, the enforcement of morality is less naturally
taken to be a general duty of every moral agent. As a Christian theist I may
think that, while I have special obligations for exerting a moral influence within
certain relationships (e.g., toward my children), shaping the character of others
for the better is not (thank God) generally my responsibility. This, in turn, gives
a theological reason for limiting the scope of my moral evaluations.
Christians have special reasons for recognizing the viciousness of judgmentalism, and believe there are theological resources for its cure; this does not,
however, make them immune to this vice. Christians are prey to judgmentalism
along with all the other failings common to humanity. What our discussion above
shows is that any judgmental ism displayed by Christians is not a product of their
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conceptual scheme but rather results from a failure to bring their praxis into line
with their theology. One current television show ends each episode by saying
"Now you know, and knowing is half the battle." Knowing may indeed be half
the battle; unfortunately, in the area of human conduct it is by far the easiest half.
I do not mean to suggest that one needs to adopt a Christian conceptual scheme
in order to recognize judgmental ism as a vice. I am merely pointing out that
judgmentalism can more easily be seen as always inappropriate in a scheme
which agrees with Christianity that "nobody's perfect."14 No matter what one's
reasons are for adopting this motto, it can, I suppose, when uttered with the
right sort of inflection serve to counter feelings of moral superiority, while when
said with a slightly different emphasis, act as an antidote to feelings of moral
inferiority. There is, however, a danger in misconstruing the implications of this
aphorism, if it leads us to attempt to avoid judgmentalism by refraining from
ever making moral evaluations of others.
III.

The emphasis which I have placed on limiting the scope of moral evaluations
might be misconstrued as a total prohibition on the moral assessment of others.
This would be unsatisfactory; in some situations it would be morally irresponsible
not to make an assessment of someone else. Many times I will have to make moral
assessments of others because they are crucial to making decisions which I am
responsible for making. Aristotle's "doctrine of the mean" is helpful at least as a
heuristic device in thinking about character because it encourages us to explore
the question of whether, for a given vice, there is a related vice at the other end of
the "scale." Since judgmentalism is in some (perhaps metaphorical) sense an
excess, is there a vice related to moral evaluation which is a "defect?" It seems
clear to me that there is: the disposition to be so adverse to making negative moral
assessments of others that one avoids doing so even when such assessments are
appropriate and warranted. It could be called moral cowardice, 15 because a person
who makes a negative assessment of someone else is taking a moral risk which
does call for courage. We do need to realize that given the complexities of the
moral life, our own moral blind spots, and the natural human tendency toward
judgmentalism, making a negative moral assessment of someone else is a morally
dangerous business. However, most of us live lives in which this risk cannot
always be responsibly avoided.
Dramatic examples can be generated l6 ; the woman who must resist the temptation to moral cowardice because she would like to close her eyes to evidence
that her husband is abusing their children. We need to avoid moral cowardice
in relatively mundane situations as well. We have to make decisions about whom
to vote for, whom to hire or promote, whom to trust with the important committee
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assignment, or whom to believe when faced with divergent accounts of a situation.
These all require assessments of character, and these assessments may come out
negative. In making such assessments we will have to make predictions of future
behavior based on past actions. We will need to distinguish between moral
mistakes which are isolated and "out of character" and those which arise from
entrenched character flaws. By keeping in mind that our data are often woefully
inadequate (even if at the time they are the best available) and thus remaining
open to reconsideration of our assessments, we can avoid stereotyping and pigeonholing people. However, we can hardly function as social beings without making
assessments of others' character, and some of these assessments will in all
probability be negative. Thus we all need to avoid moral cowardice. We cannot
responsibly try to avoid judgmentalism by adopting a policy of never making
assessments of others or by making an a priori decision that such assessments
will always be positive. What we can responsibly do in attempting to avoid
judgmentalism is to abstain from making any assessments of others at all when
there is no practical point in doing so, and to try to root out the motives and
accompanying attitudes which lead us to gloat over the failures of others.
Someone might still object to limiting the scope of our moral assessments
even to this extent. Several sorts of reasons might be given for this objection.
One might urge that limiting the scope of our moral assessments entails foregoing
the acquisition of knowledge, which is an intrinsic value. or that there is always
a practical point to making assessments of others, or that limiting the scope of
one's assessments as a cure for judgmentalism treats the symptoms rather than
the root of the problem. I will consider each of these reasons in tum.
I agree that knowledge is an intrinsic value and that justified moral assessments
which are true constitute knowledge. However, this does not entail that we
should try to acquire as much knowledge as we can by making assessments of
others' action and character whenever there is sufficient accessible data to do
so. Although knowledge is an intrinsic value, it competes with other values
which must be taken into account in determining what we should do, all things
considered. If being overly concerned with the evaluation of others' conduct
interferes with quality relationships or with living well (as I think it often does),
then I would maintain that this would override whatever intrinsic value there
might be in the bits of moral knowledge whose acquisition one might need to
forego in appropriately restricting the sphere of one's moral evaluations.
However, one might maintain that there is always a practical point in making
assessments of others; hence, such assessments are never inappropriate. Two
different reasons might be offered in support of this. The first, which we have
already discussed in Section II, claims that a person who is serious about morality
has a responsibility to be prepared to enforce morality where possible and shape
the character of others for the better when he can. Apart from the theological
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reasons given against this view in Section II, there are additional moral reasons
for finding it unsatisfactory. It displays a paternalistic attitude toward others
which shows a disrespect for their dignity as moral beings. It is also naive in
the assumption it appears to make about how much influence we can hope to
exert on others outside a relatively small circle of special relationships.
A second reason which could be given for the claim that there is always a
practical point to making moral evaluations of others is that we can learn things
about the nature of morality that cannot be learned in any other way by examining
the mistakes (and presumably also the successes) of others. Consequently, we
need to make a regular practice of assessing others' behavior so that we can
develop our capacity for moral assessment and collect a wide variety of negative
and positive moral role models. We obviously do need practice in order to hone
our evaluational skills, but such practice is not without its risks. Given that our
own motivations are often not transparent to us, and given that what should be
tentative appraisals have a tendency to harden all too quickly into preconceptions
which are resistant to new data, literary examples are much safer material for
practice at assessment than actual situations involving our friends and acquaintances. If we could know of ourselves that our motives were pure, and if we
could always be sure that our degree of assent was proportional to the amount
of available evidence, then using our friends and acquaintances to exercise our
capacity for judgment might be a good idea. I, however, doubt these conditions
are very often fulfilled.
There is a relatively safe way to use other peoples' decisions and actions as
material for thought experiments in order to develop one's capacity for moral
assessment. One can guard against judgmentalism by conducting such thought
experiments in a hypothetical manner. They may have the form "If a, b, and c
were the only morally relevant elements of x' s situation and x were to do y, that
would be a moral mistake." Even where one uses real individuals as values for
x, one can try to protect oneself from judgmentalism by keeping before one's
mind the thought that one is seldom in a position to know that a, b, and care
the only morally relevant things involved. Moreover, projecting oneself sympathetically into x's situation can prevent, or at least retard, any inclination to
enjoy x's failure. Still, that such thought experiments may for some be opportunities for judgmentalism may make literary and fictional examples safer ground
for such hypothetical judgments than those involving one's acquaintances.
This may seem to some to be an over-reaction, since limiting the scope of
one's moral assessments is not really a cure for judgmentalism. It treats the
symptoms of the vice and not the problem itself. If we wish a treatment for
judgmentalism, we should seek one which deals with its motivational roots. I
agree that this would be the ideal solution. Someone concerned about his own
judgmental ism should, by all means, try to stop feeling morally inferior or rid

Faith and Philosophy

284

himself of his moral smugness. As noted in Section II, this might involve the
thorough assimilation of a theological position. For a secularist who thinks his
negative self-image is justified, it might involve trying to become a better moral
person. In the case of irrational feelings of either superiority or inferiority,
developing one's capacity for self-assessment would be in order; or, in some
cases, perhaps even psychological therapy. One might also try to continually
remind oneself that how others "rate" morally is irrelevant to one's own moral
worth; thus, one might attempt to drive a wedge between one's motive and its
characteristic effects. These are all relatively long-term, uncertain solutions,
however. I would suggest that, although limiting one's assessments of others is
merely treating symptoms, as an interim measure it may be the best that can be
done.
IV.

We started this paper by asking about a particular situation involving the moral
evaluation of others. Can the account given here help us decide what we should
think of Christian leader B's public denouncement of Christian leader A? One
thing is clear, if B's behavior is inappropriate, this cannot be merely because
he has made a moral evaluation of someone else. We do not need to completely
abstain from moral evaluation in order to avoid judgmentalism. Although this
would be an effective way of avoiding it, it would be somewhat like cutting off
one's hand to get rid of a hangnail. We might accidentally blunder into living
well without ever thinking about ethics, but some of us will not be this lucky.
Our consideration of moral cowardice has shown that we cannot even avoid
judgmentalism by restricting our assessments to self-assessments without falling
into yet another vice. Our only option is to aim at what might be called judiciousness, the "mean" between judgmentalism and moral cowardice.
What is judiciousness? It is the disposition to make moral assessments of
others "at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right
people, with the right motive, and in the right way. "17 This may seem like empty
advice; what are the right times and ways and motives? We have gone some
way toward answering these questions by examining the vices on either side of
judiciousness. The right times to make assessments of others are occasions when
such assessments are necessary to carry out our responsibilities. The right objects
of such assessments are actions or aspects of character which are of genuine
moral relevance rather than those which are morally indifferent. 18 The right way
to make such assessments is with due care and humility. The motive we should
avoid is moral one-up-manship.
So is B being judgmental toward A, or is he being judicious? One thing this
paper has, I hope, made clear is that unless we know a great deal about B's
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role, his relationship to A, and his attitudes and motives in evaluating A, it
would be highly injudicious of us to venture an answer to this question. If we
are, for example, contributors to either B's or A's organizations, we may need
to draw responsible conclusions about their actions and characters; thus, we may
have an obligation to get what reliable data we can and form a judgment on its
basis. If we have no such connections with either A or B, we may be wise to
spend our time on other things. It would certainly be irresponsible (and if done
for the wrong motive, judgmental) to form a judgment concerning either B or
A based on the kind of information most of us have from the media. Thus, we
may have to resist the temptations presented by the "opinion poll" mentality of
our culture. Being judicious is not easy; there are many ways to miss the mark
and only one way to hit it. But now we know somewhat more about what we
are aiming at, and knowing is at least part of the battle. 19
Hope College (Ml)

NOTES
I. "Judgmentalness" would be more grammatically natural; however, "judgmentalism" does seem
to be the term in common use.
2. For readers who have never met people of this sort and would like the example fleshed out, I
recommend Flannery O'Connor's short story "Everything That Rises Must Converge," in the collection by the same name.
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 66ff.
4. I assume here, rather than argue, that the beliefs listed are false. The claims I make about ethics
are not uncontroversial and particular readers may have particular disagreements with them. Given
the structure of my account of judgmentalism, it is not necessary that one agree with all the claims
about ethics made here in order to think that the account has captured what is central to the
defectiveness of judgmentalism.

5. This is not an espousal of non-cognitivism. By claiming that ethics is practical I mean three
things: (I) Ethical judgments are about conduct and character. (2) Although one could take a purely
theoretical interest in acquiring as much moral knowledge as possible, there would be something
perverse in an avid theoretical interest in ethics coupled with a total indifference to the application
of that knowledge to one's own conduct. (3) In ethics it is appropriate for theoretical interests to be
subservient to the centrally practical concern of ethics.
6. This claim is highly controversial; see Section III for some remarks in its defense.

7. Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1980), pp. 192-94.
8. "Judge not, that you be not judged. For with the judgment you pronounce you will be judged,
and the measure you give will be the measure you get. Why do you see the speck that is in your
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brother's eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye? Or how can you say to your brother,
'Let me take the speck out of your eye,' when there is the log in your own eye? You hypocrite,
first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your
brother's eye." (Matthew 7:1-5)
9. One Christian tradition which contrasts with the one here discussed is theological perfectionism.
10. This at least is my interpretation of passages like "You have heard that it was said to the men
of old, 'You shall not kill; and whoever kills shall be liable to judgment.' But I say to you that
every one who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment; whoever insults his brother
shall be liable to council, and whoever says, 'You fool" shall be liable to the hell of fire." (Matthew
5:21-22)
11. Paul espouses this attitude in Galatians 6: I. I am aware that this contrasts with attitudes which
he appears to espouse elsewhere, for example in I Corinthians 5. Given that this is not a paper in
biblical theology, I am happy to feel justified in claiming that harmonizing all of Paul's varied
remarks on this subject is well beyond the scope of this work. One guess at a charitable explanation
for what Paul says in I Corinthians 5 would be that he is urging the Corinthians to avoid moral
cowardice (see section JII). Paul's evaluation of the situation sounds harsh; perhaps the situation
warrants a harsh attitude. Judiciousness (see Section IV) often looks like judgmentalism to people
who know less about the situation being evaluated than does the person who makes the judgment.
This is why the perceivedjudgmentalism of others is such a tempting occasion for judgmentalism.
12. I have been discussing the Christian theological tradition because it is the one with which I am
most familiar; however, many of the points made here would also apply to branches of Judaism.
See, for example, Abraham Heschel's insightful discussion of divine pathos in The Prophets (New
York: Harper & Row, 1962).
13. Paul and James both express this view (Romans 14:10. James 4:12).
14. Actually, something stronger than this is needed. Even if one thinks that nobody is perfect, it
does not follow that no one is morally superior to anyone else. Apart from theological reasons, there
are several considerations which might lead someone to believe that thinking oneself morally superior
to others is inappropriate. One might take the view that, given that very many people who think
themselves morally superior are mistaken, the hypothesis that one's assessment of oneself is likely
to err on the positive side is an indispensable one for moral improvement. The hypothesis that one
has moral imperfections of which one is unaware might function in the ethical life in a way analogous
to that in which the assumption that there are no brute facts is sometimes taken to function in science.
Alternatively, one could take the view that taking pleasure in another's failings is itself a serious
moral failing, so that one who enjoys seeing others fail because it reinforces his self-assessment as
superior ipso facto suffers from a fault serious enough to disqualify him as morally superior.
IS. Another form of moral cowardice (call it "moral cowardice*") would be the unWillingness to
express or act on the negative moral assessments which one did form even on occasions when such
actions or expressions were morally required. Although moral cowardice* is probably more common
than the type of moral cowardice I am discussing here it lacks some of the philosophically interesting
parallels to judgmentalism. Judgmentalism involves a misperception of reality in the negative direction, while moral cowardice involves a misperception which blinds the moral coward to negative
aspects of reality which ought to be apprehended. In contrast, moral cowardice* is not an intellectual
vice at all.
16. One interpretation of Joseph Conrad's, Lord Jim (New York: Doubleday, 1920) could take Jim's
behavior at the end of the novel as a display of moral cowardice. Jim, as "Lord," has a responsibility
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to protect his villagers, but when confronted with the decision of what to do about Brown (an
obviously untrustworthy adventurer who is holed up near the village), Jim lets Brown go. Brown
responds by wantonly killing several villagers. I think Conrad makes it clear that Jim does have
enough data to conclude Brown is not to be trusted and that Jim's failure to make and act on this
assessment results from the moral insecurity he still feels because of his own past failing. It is
appropriate to note here that Jim's situation is a very difficult one; while I think his omission is a
moral mistake, I am not at all sure it is blameworthy.
17. This is an application of Aristotle's criteria for virtue in his Nicomachean Ethics Il06b20-2S.
18. One popular caricature of Christian moralism would assume that from a Christian view /lothing
is morally indifferent. However, this has certainly not been part of the "mainline Christian tradition."
John Calvin (hardly a theological liberal), for example, makes the following remarks, "We are not
bound before God to any observance of external things which are in themselves indifferent, . . . .
The knowledge of this liberty is very necessary to us; where it is wanting our consciences will have
no rest .... For when once the conscience is entangled in the net, it enters a long and inextricable
labyrinth, from which it is afterwards most difficult to escape. When a man begins to doubt whether
it is lawful for him to use linen in sheets. . he will no longer be secure as to hemp, . .. If he
hesitates as to a more genial wine, he will scarcely drink the worst with a good conscience; at last
he will not dare to touch water if more than usually sweet and pure" Calvin's Institutes (Mac Dill,
Florida: MacDonald Publishing), p. 443.
19. I am grateful to my colleagues at Western Washington University (Hugh Fleetwood, Phillip
Montegue, Thomas Downing, Richard Purtill and Mark Hinchliff) for a stimulating discussion of
one version of this paper, and to Ann Baker Siler, Laurence Bonjour and Robert 1. Richman as
well as two referees at Faith and Philosophy for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

